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1System-Level Vulnerability Assessment for EME:
From Fault Tree Analysis to Bayesian
Networks—Part II: Illustration
to Microcontroller System
Congguang Mao, Flavio G.Canavero, Zhitong Cui, and Dongyuang Sun
Abstract—The vulnerability of microcontroller system against
high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) is taken as an illustra-
tion to demonstrate the assessment methodology based on Bayesian
networks (BN). The complete procedure is performed by two steps:
the qualitative and the quantitative. The first step focuses on the
analysis of three classes of properties, the electromagnetic environ-
ment, system function/structure, and their interactions. The pri-
mary BN model is built at the end of the first step. The second step
investigates the BN nodes and branches one by one, which further
implemented through two stages, i.e., the data acquisition and data
fusion. The susceptibilities of devises are examined with the pulsed
current injection. The responses of the transmission lines to HEMP
are computed using the field-line coupling model. Comparing the
probability density functions of the electromagnetic stresses and
strengths produces the failure probabilities of the interface com-
ponents. Through two-step analysis, the critical elements and cou-
pling paths are identified and highlighted. After neglecting those
unimportant factors, many BN nodes and branches are deleted.
Thus, the complexity of assessment is reduced. By assigning the
probability values to the simplified BN model, the system failure
probability is calculated, which characterizes the system vulner-
ability against HEMP environment. The illustration validates the
rationality and flexibility of the BN assessment methodology.
Index Terms—Assessment, Bayesian networks (BNs), E3, EME,
HEMP, IEMI, vulnerability.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE objective of vulnerability assessment is to find the po-tential risk or to authenticate the performance of protective
design. As a system of systems or subsystems, the system-level
vulnerability is hard to quantitatively characterize.
For the manageable system assessment against high-altitude
electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) and high-power electromagnetic
environment, one specific standard, IEC 61000-5-9, is published
by International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and the
test procedure is recommended [1]. However, for the larger or
more complex system, a unified analysis framework is badly
necessary, which can divide the whole system into relatively
independent and manageable subsystems. Then the test can be
carried out. Unfortunately, no such technique is recommended
by the standard. Neither does the characterization parameter of
the system-level effects. The assessment methodology based on
Bayesian Networks (BN) is built to help to fulfill this mission.
The complete assessment is executed by two main steps: the
qualitative analysis and the quantitative calculation. First, the
properties of system, electromagnetic environment (EME), and
their interactions are analyzed, and the primary BN model is
built. Then, the electromagnetic strength of the interface com-
ponents and their stresses are investigated. At this point, tests
play the most important role [2]–[4]. Comparison of these two
categories of data produces the failure probabilities of com-
ponents, which can indicate the sensitivity. After deleting the
nodes with no effects, the BN model is simplified. The relative
probabilities are assigned to the left nodes and the system failure
probability is calculated finally.
These contents are organized as follows. Section II analyzes
the interaction of the EME and system, and builds the primary
BN model. All the data of threshold and stresses are acquired
and processed statistically in Section III. Section IV presents the
complete assessment procedure. Finally, Section V discusses the
issues need to be done further.
II. SYSTEM QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
For the extensive application in industry, the smart control
system, composed with the computer and microcontroller, is
chosen as the object of investigation. The radiated susceptibility
of the microcontrollers and computers are studied individually
in [5]–[7]. Here both of the devices are connected. Furthermore,
the microcontroller is extended into a macromodel containing
several components, every of which stands for one system or
subsystem. The system operates in the buildings. The computer
is installed in shielding rooms and microcontroller in the equip-
ment box.
In practice, all the possible classes of EMEs could impact the
system, such as HEMP, intentional electromagnetic interference
(IEMI), high-intensity radio field, etc. Here, for simplicity, only
HEMP is considered as one kind of extreme EME. What should
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2be noted is that the definition of IEMI in many documents mainly
refers to the high-power microwave. Despite of difference at
many aspects, it is believed to be similar as far as the assessment
procedure is concerned. The early-time HEMP environment is
defined in standard [8]: the maximal peak value of the electric
field is up to 50 kV/m; the rise time is 2.5 ns, and the half-width
at 50% maximum is 23 ns.
In this qualitative analysis, the system function and structure
are presented and the fault tree (FT) models are built. Then, the
coupling of the system with the electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
is analyzed using the electromagnetic topology (EMT). Finally,
the BNs model integrates the FT and EMT.
A. System Structure
The controller is designed to execute of the computer com-
mands, which is coded with digital logic. After start or reset, the
first series of code is stored in the microcontroller as the com-
mand, if the following codes are identical with those stored, the
light-emitting diode will be lightened as the indicator, or the
indicator will not be lightened.
The mission is executed by three steps: the command emis-
sion, transmission, and judgment, which corresponds three hard-
wares: the computer, transmission interfaces, and microcon-
troller. Furthermore, the computer subsystem is composed with
the host computer and accessories, such as keyboard, display
device and mouse, all of which are linked by short cables. The
transmission subsystems composed the 232 bus processer, 20 m-
long transmission lines, and 485 interfaces integrated circuit
(IC), which transform the computer command into microcon-
troller codes, and the microcontroller is supplied by the direct
current to direct current (dc/dc) converter to provide the power
of 5 V and reset by the solid-state relay. The whole system is
supplied by the commercial grid, whose susceptibility is not
concerned in this control system. The components and the func-
tions are corresponding one by one and depicted in Fig. 1(a).
Because three subsystems are in series from the point view of
the reliability, each of their failure will lead to the system break-
down, which means they construct the OR-logic in FT model.
Similarly, all the components of subsystems are necessary, ex-
cept that two dc/dc modules are designed as the redundancy.
The FT model of system is shown in Fig. 1(b).
The structure function of FT is expressed as
P (V ) =
3∑
i=1
P ′i =
4∑
m=1
P1,m +
2∑
n=1
P2,n +
4∑
k=1
P3,k (1)
where P ′i is the probabilities of three subsystems C′k , k =
1, 2, 3; P1,m , P2,n , and P3,k are relatively the failure probabil-
ities of components Ci,j , i = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, 2, 3, 4; and proba-
bility of the redundant design P3,1 = P3,1,1 · P3,1,2 .
B. Coupling Analysis with EMT
The coupling of EME with system is analyzed with the
EMT method, which is common for all the categories of EME.
The dominant coupling path and victim components will be
suggested.
Fig. 1. Function, structure, and FT model of microcontroller system. (a) Func-
tion and structure. (b) FT model.
According to the code rules of EMT [9], the exterior and
interior building are denoted as V0 and V1 , and two shielding
cavities containing computer and microcontroller are denoted as
V2,1 and V2,2 . The components contained in closures are coded
similarly as Fig. 2. They are impacted by the field penetrating
into cavities. In order to highlight the conducted effects of the
transmission lines in V1 , the cables are also coded as L1 , L2 ,
and L3 . The electromagnetic structure and EMT of the system
are depicted in Fig. 3.
Because of the shielding protection of subsystems, the con-
ducted effects will be significant. So the transmission lines be-
tween computer and microcontroller are primarily judged to be
the critical coupling paths.
C. Primary BN Model of System
The complete process involves two factors: HEMP and sys-
tem (V) effects. EMP propagates through the concrete iron build-
ing and shielding room or equipment box, and become the am-
bient environment of system (AEME). Coupling with cables,
the free fields induce currents and the electromagnetic stresses
(Stres) cause the breakdown of components (Comp), which
3Fig. 2. Electromagnetic structure and EMT of system.
Fig. 3. BNs model of system vulnerability against EME.
further result the failure of subsystems (Subs) and finally upset
the whole system. Based on the interfering rules of BN [10],
structure function is formulated as
PV (V,EMI) = P (V |Subs)P (Subs|Comp)
× P (Comp,Stres)P (Stres|AEME)
× P (AEME|HEMP)P (HEMP). (2)
This joint probability is a measure of the vulnerable degree of
system in HEMP.
Connecting EMT and FT with the causal relationship, i.e.,
the theory of stress–strength interference (SSI), the primary BN
model is built (see Fig. 3). The nodes stand for the free fields,
currents, and the concrete structures, i.e., shields, conductors,
components, subsystems, and systems. The arrows display the
causal dependent relationships from the ambient environments
to the stresses and from components to subsystems and final
systems. BN reveals all the possible coupling and failure paths.
Moreover, two classes of stresses and susceptibilities are also
suggested to be measured or calculated, i.e., the radiated and the
conducted.
III. SYSTEM QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
Every node and branch in BN, especially the electromagnetic
stress (EMS) and the susceptibility of the items, will be checked.
Here, three principles will be abided by: 1) to find the maximal
EMS; 2) to determine the minimal susceptibility; 3) to process
the data with statistical techniques.
A. Radiated EMS and Susceptibility
In this illustration, EMP is the only one class of considered
EMI, which means HEMP constitute the total set of EMI. And
the interior environment of the building is similar. So
P (HEMP) = P (V0) = 1 (3)
P (AEME,HEMP) = P (V1 , V0) = P (V1 |V0)P (V0) = 1.
(4)
For the carefully designed concrete iron buildings, the shield-
ing effectiveness (SE) of electric field for HEMP may be up to
40 dB [11]. Considering the windows and doors may deterio-
rate the shielding ability, the SE reduces to 20 dB. Based on
the specifications of shielding room and equipment box, their
standard SEs may be up to 80 dB. Similarly, accounting the de-
terioration and aging, the SE is set to 60 dB. The residual fields,
roughly estimating, may be reduced to less than 100 V/m, and
the interference thresholds of computer and microcontroller are
greater than 1 kV/m [5], [6]. Thus, both of the subsystems are
safe against radiated disturbance, i.e.,
P (Comp|Stres) = P (Comp < Stres) = 0. (5)
B. Conducted EMS and Susceptibility
As we know, the waveform will be distorted somewhat when
EMP penetrates into the building. How to predict the interior
environment is a time-consuming issue and need to explain
specifically. Here, in order to highlight the assessment, this com-
plicated subject is simplified. The incident EMP waveform is
still described by the double-exponential function.
Since the signal intensity will decrease after EMP penetrates
into the building, the multiconductors are illuminated only with
fields of 5 kV/m. Moreover, it is possible for every conductor to
be exposed in the electromagnetic wave at its maximal receiving
area, so all the conductors are regarded identically and indepen-
dently. The peak values of the induced currents are taken to
denote the EMS. The electromagnetic threshold of the terminal
component is defined as the maximal strength to tolerate the
EMS.
1) Conducted EMS: Utilizing the Taylor model of transmis-
sion line [12], the terminal induced current I(L) of single over-
head wire for EMP is calculated, and the maximums of currents
‖I‖∞ are observed as EMS. The parameters in the computation
model are as following.
4Fig. 4. CPF of EMS at transmission line terminal.
The incident angle ψ′ ∈ [18, 90◦], azimuth angle φ′ ∈
[0, 90◦], and polarizing angle α′ ∈ [0, 90◦] are taken as the ran-
dom variables and sampled with equal step Δ = 18◦.
The other parameters are deterministic for the given system:
1) the exciting EMP: E0 = 5 kV/m, k = 1.3, α = 4× 107 and
β = 6× 108 ; 2) the transmission line: length L = 20 m, height
h = 3 m, radius of perfect conducting wires a = 1.5× 10−3 m,
terminal loads Z0 = ZL = 2 Ω; 3) the lossy ground: conductiv-
ity σg = 0.01 S/m, relative permittivity εrg = 10.
The size of the samples is 180, with maximum 81.2 A, mini-
mum 0 A. The goodness-of-fitting of the distribution function is
tested by the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (K–S) test, and the critical
value (CV) is 0.10122 at significance level α∗ = 0.05 [14]. Fi-
nally, the statistic of the normal distribution is 0.08405, which
is less than CV. Then, the hypothesis that the EMS conforms
the normal distribution function N(μ, σ2) is accepted with the
mean value μ = 41.419 A and the variance σ = 15.437 A. The
cumulative distribution function (CDF) is shown in Fig. 4, and
the probability density function (pdf) is
f(x) =
1
σ
√
2π
exp
(
−1
2
(
x− μ
σ
)2)
. (6)
2) Conducted Susceptibility: The susceptibility of the port
devices (see Fig. 5) are examined by the pulsed current injection
(PCI) because of its high efficiency and convenient operation
[15], [16]. The current waveform is rectangular with tow param-
eters: the magnitude and width. The devices are embedded in
the system are tested at the operating state. The injection point
is just the pin connecting the long line. Before and after every
shot, the item and the system functions are checked carefully.
The magnitude increases gradually until the device is broken
down and the system blacks out. During the process from to-
tally good to totally bad, all the effects phenomena and data
are recorded. After the tests of 20 to 30 samples are completed,
all the data with the same fault mode are collected. Finally, by
Fig. 5. Microcontroller subsystem under test.
processing these threshold data with the same statistical method
as the EMS, the CDF of susceptibility is determined.
For the 485 IC and dc/dc converter, three fault modes are
found, the static, soft, and hard. The pulse width cannot cause
extra effects. The static damage means that the state parame-
ter of the component has deviated from the rated sets, but no
abnormal functions of the system are observed. If the system
is malfunctioned by the injected currents and can recover after
restarting, the phenomenon is called as the soft interferences.
By further improving the magnitude of the exciting currents,
the components will be broken down thoroughly, which are
named as the hard damage. For the hard fault mode, the system
will black out and cannot restore until the collapsed device is
replaced.
After statistical processing, the CDFs of 485 IC and dc/dc
are founded [see Fig. 6(a) and (b)]. For one device, the static
threshold is the lowest and the hard the highest. However, be-
cause of the dispersion of the sample data, it is possible for three
threshold sets to overlay somewhat.
For the solid-state relay, only the fault of the false trigger is
found. During the tests of different pulse widths 0.3, 0.5, 1.0,
5.0, and 10.0 μs, it is obvious that the thresholds vary with pulse
widths, twc . The five groups of data can all be fitted with normal
distribution N(μ, σ2) [see Fig. 6(c)], and the coefficients μ and
σ can be fitted by the exponential polynomial functions (see
Fig. 7)
μ(twc) = 37.7730× e(−twc /0.2463) + 4.8577− 0.2169× twc
(7a)
σ(twc) = 1.6291× e(−twc /0.3795) + 1.0558− 0.0789× twc.
(7b)
Massive calculations indicate that the widths of the response
currents I(L) cannot exceed 0.1 μs. So by substituting twc =
0.1μs into (7) and (8), the rational distribution function of relay
is estimated as normality with μ = 30.006 and σ = 2.2996. All
the distribution functions are listed in Table I.
3) Probabilities of Devices About Conducted Effects: With
the SSI theory, every mode failure probabilities of devices PF
5Fig. 6. Failure thresholds of components. (a) 485 IC. (b) dc/dc. (c) Solid-state
relay.
are calculated by
PC = P (Comp,Stres) = P (y ≥ x)
=
∫ ym a x
xm in
g(y)dy
∫ y
xm in
f (x) dx (8)
Fig. 7. Parameter fitting of distribution function for solid-state relay.
where Comp stand for nodes C3,3 , {C2,2,i}, {C3,1,i}, and Stres
for {V2,2,i}, i = 1, 2, 3; f(x) and g(y) are relatively the pdfs of
the thresholds and EMS; x ∈ [xmin , xmax] and y ∈ [ymin , ymax]
are peaks of the terminal currents ‖I‖∞. The SSI curves of
485 IC, dc/dc and solid-state relay are shown in Fig. 8, and the
failure probabilities PC are listed in Table I.
For the endpoints of xmin , xmax , ymin , and ymax , the rule of
3σ for the normal distribution can provide good reference. If
X ∼ N(μ, σ2)
F (μ− 3σ ≤ x ≤ μ + 3σ) ≈ 99.7%.
So for the normal distribution, [xmin , xmax] = [μ− 3σ, μ +
3σ]. For other distributions, the endpoints are chosen at the
quantiles of 0.15% and 99.85%.
Moreover, the overlaying portion of stress with the thresholds
Pt can reflect the threat degree of the coupling paths
P (Stres|AEME) = Pt =
∫ ym a x
xm in
g(y)dy. (9)
So the coupling parameters of transmission lines L1 , L2 , and
L3 are assigned as about the maximums of Pt listed in Table I
485 · IC : P (V2,2,1 |V1) ≈ 0.99 (10)
DC/DC : P (V2,2,2 |V1) ≈ 0.98 (11)
Relay : P (V2,2,3 |V1) ≈ 0.88. (12)
C. Assessment Result of Whole System Based on BN
It must be pointed that no faults are observed for 232 IC
and computer subsystem, which mean they are stronger. After
the radiated and conducted effects analysis, all the nodes and
branches judged to be safe can be deleted. On the other hand,
the component with the multistate faults is extended into three
nodes. For example, the node of 485 processor C2,2 is extended
into C2,2,1 , C2,2,2 , and C2,2,3 . It should also be noticed that two
dc/dc converters C3,1,1 and C3,1,2 are identical, and so do the
paths of V2,2,2 to C3,1,1 and V2,2,2 to C3,1,2 . Thus, the latter can
be simplified into one dashed line.
The original BN model of Fig. 3 is modified and shown in
Fig. 9, where three salient effect scenarios are displayed. The
6TABLE I
THRESHOLDS DISTRIBUTION OF COMPONENTS
Modes 485 IC DC/DC convertor Solid-sate Relay
pdf PC Pt Pw pdf PC Pt Pw pdf PC Pt
static N (μ, σ 2 ) μ = 7.9754
σ = 1.6287
0.9804 0.9921 13
46
Log-Logistic(α , β , γ )2
α = 2.9022
β = 3.1692
γ = 7.6582
0.9693 0.9843 33
94
– – –
soft N (μ, σ 2 )
μ = 15.0 σ = 2.5036
0.9506 0.9847 6
46
N (μ, σ 2 ) μ = 22.592
σ = 2.8394
0.9604 0.8813 26
94
N (μ, σ 2 ) μ = 30.006
σ = 2.2996
0.7644 0.8809
hard Lognormal(μ , σ , γ )1
μ = 0.53459 σ = 1.565
γ = 6.679
0.9442 0.9865 27
46
N (μ, σ 2 ) μ = 26.783
σ = 4.8447
0.8140 0.9693 35
94
– – –
1Lognormal(μ , σ , γ ):f (x) =
exp
(
− 1
2
(
ln(x − γ ) − μ
σ
) 2 )
(x − γ )σ√2π ;
2Log-Logistic(α , β , γ ):f (x) = α
β
(
x − γ
β
)α −1 (
1 +
(
x − γ
β
)α )−2
.
first one is that the EMP (V0) through building (V1) propagates
to cable (L1), breaks down 485 IC (C2,2) and lead to the failure
of transmission subsystem (C ′2). The second one starts from
EMP, interrupts the power supply of dc/dc (C3,1), and the third is
triggering the solid-state relay (C3,2). The last two events cause
the fault of the microcontroller (C ′3). Considering the effect
independence, every scenario can be examined respectively. The
structure function (2) is embodied as
PV (V, IEMI) = P (V2,2,1 , V0)P (C2,2 , V2,2,1)P (C ′2 |C2,2)P (V |C ′2)
+ P (V2,2,2 , V0)P (C3,1 , V2,2,2)P (C ′3 |C3,1)P (V |C ′3)
+ P (V2,2,3 , V0)P (C3,2 , V2,2,3)P (C ′3 |C2,2)P (V |C ′3) (13)
where P (V2,2,i , V0) = P (V0)P (V1 |V0)P (V2,2,i |V1), i = 1,
2, 3.
The fault of 485 IC and dc/dc converter may be regarded as
one set and constituted by three portions: the static, soft, and
hard. In FTA, the XOR-logic and noisy-gate can be applied to
the multimode failure model [17], whereas the weighted sum
approach is used in BN for this multicause to one-result structure
[13]. The weight of every portion Pw is measured by the ratio
of the sample size of each mode against the total. Taking 485
IC as an example, the sample size of each mode is relatively
13, 6, and 27, then the number of total samples is 46. So the
weights Pw = P (C2,2,i |V2,2,1), i = 1, 2, 3, are relatively 13/46,
6/46, and 27/46. The weights indicate the occurring possibilities
of different modes and are also listed in Table I. Utilizing the
total probability formulation, the joint probability of 485 IC
P (C2,2 , V2,2,1) =
3∑
k=1
P (C2,2 |C2,2,k )P (C2,2,k , V2,2,1)
= 0.9804× 13
46
+ 0.9506× 6
46
+ 0.9442
× 26
46
≈ 0.9347. (14)
The same method can be applied to the dc/dc converter
P (C3,1,1 , V2,2,2) = P (C3,1,2 , V2,2,2) =
3∑
i=1
P (C3,1,1 |C3,1,1,i)
P (C3,1,1,i , V2,2,2) ≈ 0.9090. (15)
The redundant design in FTA is described by the AND-logic,
whereas in BN it is modeled as the converging structure. Because
the simultaneous failure of two converters C3,1,1 and C3,1,2 can
lead to the blackout, they form the certain event of the power
failure, C3,1 . So the conditional probability
P (C3,1 |C3,1,1 , C3,1,2) = 1 (16)
and the joint probability
P (C3,1 , C3,1,1 , C3,1,2) = P (C3,1,1)P (C3,1,2)
P (C3,1 |C3,1,1 , C3,1,2), (17)
where P (C3,1,1) = P (C3,1,2) = P (C3,1,1 , V2,2,2). Thus,
P (C3,1 , V2,2,2) = P (C3,1,1 , V2,2,2)P (C3,1,2 , V2,2,2)× 1
= 0.9090× 0.9090 ≈ 0.8263. (18)
Actually, the same result as (18) can be deduced by De
Morgan’s theorem [18].
C3,1 and C3,2 constitute the total set of the failure of the
subsystem C ′3 , and considering the importance of the power
supply the conditional probabilities
P (C ′3 |C3,1) = 0.6, P (C ′3 |C3,2) = 1− 0.6 = 0.4. (19)
Since the failure of C ′2 only depends on C2,2 , the probability
P (C ′2 |C2,2) = 1. (20)
Similarly, the dependant relationships of the total system V
and the subsystems C ′2 and C ′3 can be described as
P (V |C ′3) = 0.3, P (V |C ′2) = 1− 0.3 = 0.7. (21)
7Fig. 8. SSI. (a) 485 IC. (b) dc/dc. (c) Solid-state relay.
Based on the analysis, three causal scenarios of effects are char-
acterized quantitatively, i.e.,
P (V |V2,2,1) = P (C2,2 ,V2,2,1)P (C ′2 |C2,2)P (V |C ′2)
= 0.9347× 1× 0.7 ≈ 06543 (22)
P (V |V2,2,2) = P (C3,1 ,V2,2,2)P (C ′3 |C3,1)P (V |C ′3)
= 0.8263× 0.6× 0.3 ≈ 0.1487 (23)
Fig. 9. Modified BN model.
P (V |V2,2,3) = P (C3,3 ,V2,2,3)P (C ′3 |C3,3)P (V |C ′3)
= 0.7644× 0.4× 0.3 ≈ 0.0917. (24)
Finally, the final system failure probability
P (V, IEMI) =
(
3∑
i=1
P (V2,2,i , V0)P (V |V2,2,i)
)
= 1× (0.99× 0.6543 + 0.98× 0.1487 + 0.88
× 0.0917) ≈ 0.8742. (25)
This indicates that the system is susceptible to HEMP at
the possibility of 87.42%. With the qualitative and quantitative
analysis, the critical items and coupling paths are determined.
IV. SYSTEM-LEVEL ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE
For the distribution system, the evaluation data are usually
obtained by means of the local tests. All the results of judge and
analysis can be further examined by completed system-level
illumination test, if possible and necessary. The illumination
test close to reality is recommended to check thoroughly the
susceptibility of systems or subsystems [1], [4], [16]. In this
case, the assessment above can serve as the preanalysis.
On the other hand, accounting for the cost and practical limits,
it is impossible for the system-level illumination to inspect all
the uncertain parameters. Generally, only the most significant
and measurable effects are checked. Then, such illuminations
become the sampling of all the possible cases in assessment.
In order to put emphasis on the assessment methodology,
some details are reduced in this example if only the necessary
data, although rough, is obtained. For instance, there will be res-
onance when EMP penetrates into buildings, which can change
the wire response and the probability distribution function. To
improve the assessment precision, the neglected factors can be
restudied and more accurate coupling model should be adopted.
It must be noticed that the physical mechanism is essential in
the modeling and data acquisition.
8The system-level assessment is time consuming and costly. So
it will be better that the assessment is carried out from roughly
to precisely. This means at the first step, the most significant
properties are chosen to analyze the risk. If it indicates that
there could be potential threats, more detailed investigation is
performed, or it is not necessary to continue the following in-
vestigation. Through the repeated iteration, the weaknesses and
significant interfering paths are cognized from vague to clear.
The completed assessment procedure is summarized as fol-
lows:
1) To define the EMEs.
2) To analyze the system function and determine the critical
components for missions.
3) To clarify the propagation path of electromagnetic en-
ergy from exterior to interior for given category of EMI.
4) To draw the BN model in detailed.
5) To pick out those critical components on the interfering
paths.
6) To carry out the local tests and calculation to estimate
the EMS and thresholds.
7) To calculate the failure probabilities of components.
8) To highlight the susceptible items and dominant coupling
paths and simplify the BN model.
9) To illuminate the whole system or subsystems and prove
the results of analysis, if it is feasible.
10) To promote the assessment accuracy, increase the sam-
ples and consider more factors and repeat 3)–9).
11) To present the primary assessment conclusion.
12) To consider other kinds of EME, repeat the procedures
of 1)–11).
13) To conclude the system-level vulnerability against EME.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The microcontroller system is taken as an object to perform
the complete vulnerability assessment. The vulnerability is char-
acterized by the joint probability of system failure and EMI.
All the activities, involving the analysis, computation, tests and
data statistical processing, are integrated into one framework
built based on BN. The assessment procedure is summarized
and presented.
The EME effects are formulized as one causal scenario and
all the factors of environment, coupling, component suscepti-
bility, system constitution, and vulnerability are characterized
with the marginal, conditional, or joint probabilities. The failure
probability can reflect the environment threat or risk. The main
coupling path and weak element can provide the suggestion for
protective design and illumination test of the entire system.
This primary application indicates that the BN methodology
is of the definite physical and statistical foundation. They are
helpful to model, acquire data, and finally quantify the system
effects.
This illustration also points out the important subjects nec-
essary to further study 1) aiming the distributed systems EME
effects, such as the grid and communication networks, the BN
model of the system reliability should be built; 2) every as-
sessment step, such as system modeling, data acquisition and
statistical processing, can bring the uncertainty to the final re-
sult. The uncertainty source need to be clarified and limited to
improve the assessment accuracy; 3) the consistency and com-
pletion of the data from all kinds of approaches is critical for
the reliable assessment conclusion.
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